Politics Blog

“I would like to thank them.”

– General Vo Nguyen Giap, who led North Vietnamese forces during the Vietnam war, about American anti-war protesters like John Kerry.

Rich Lowry sums up John Kerry’s character:

Whenever [Kerry] says, “I have personally always believed [fill in the blank],” it islikely: 1) he doesn’t believe it; 2) he either didn’t believe it at some time prior, or is about to stop believing in it.

From the Associated Press: L. Paul Bremer, the U.S. administrator in Iraq, said in a speech six months before the September 11, 2001 attacks that the Bush administration was “paying no attention” to terrorism.

“What they will do is stagger along until there’s a major incident and then suddenly say, ‘Oh my God, shouldn’t we be organized to deal with this,"‘ said Bremer at McCormick Tribune Foundation conference on terrorism on February 26, 2001.

If Bremer really said this, it calls into question his judgment, given that the Bush administration had just assumed office for just over a month. Meanwhile, a National Review article by Barbara Lerner accuses Bremer of setting a policy that punishes America’s friends and rewards its enemies in Iraq.

In Lerner’s opinion, Bremer is essentially hoarding responsibility over Iraq without actually doing anything with that power. Here’s the relevant passage:

General Garner was replaced by L. Paul Bremer, a State Department man who kept most of the power in his own hands and diluted what little power Chalabi, Talabani, and Barzani had by appointing not six but 22 other Iraqis to share power with them. This resulted in a rapidly rotating 25-man queen-for-a-day-type leadership that turned the Iraqi Governing Council into a faceless mass, leaving Bremer’s face as the only one most Iraqis saw.

By including fence-sittersand hostile elements as well as American friends in his big, unwieldy IGC and giving them all equal weight, Bremer hoped to display a kind of inclusive, above-it-all neutrality that would win over hostile segments of Iraqi society and convince them that a fully representative Iraqi democracy would emerge. But Iraqis didn’t see it that way. Many saw a foreign occupation of potentially endless length, led by the sort of Americans who can’t be trusted to back up their friends or punish their enemies. Iraqis saw, too, that Syria and Iran had no and were busily entrenching their agents and terrorist recruits into Iraqi society to organize, fund, and equip Sunni bitter-enders like those now terrorizing Fallujah and Shiite thugs like Moqtada al Sadr, the man who is holding hostage the holy city of Najaf.

Slate has a PowerPoint presentation of John Kerry’s military record. I particularly like slides 5 thru 9.

“I would like to thank them.”

– General Vo Nguyen Giap, who led North Vietnamese forces during the Vietnam war, about American anti-war protesters like John Kerry.

Rich Lowry sums up John Kerry’s character:

Whenever [Kerry] says, “I have personally always believed [fill in the blank],” it islikely: 1) he doesn’t believe it; 2) he either didn’t believe it at some time prior, or is about to stop believing in it.

From the Associated Press: L. Paul Bremer, the U.S. administrator in Iraq, said in a speech six months before the September 11, 2001 attacks that the Bush administration was “paying no attention” to terrorism.

“What they will do is stagger along until there’s a major incident and then suddenly say, ‘Oh my God, shouldn’t we be organized to deal with this,"‘ said Bremer at McCormick Tribune Foundation conference on terrorism on February 26, 2001.

If Bremer really said this, it calls into question his judgment, given that the Bush administration had just assumed office for just over a month. Meanwhile, a National Review article by Barbara Lerner accuses Bremer of setting a policy that punishes America’s friends and rewards its enemies in Iraq.

In Lerner’s opinion, Bremer is essentially hoarding responsibility over Iraq without actually doing anything with that power. Here’s the relevant passage:

General Garner was replaced by L. Paul Bremer, a State Department man who kept most of the power in his own hands and diluted what little power Chalabi, Talabani, and Barzani had by appointing not six but 22 other Iraqis to share power with them. This resulted in a rapidly rotating 25-man queen-for-a-day-type leadership that turned the Iraqi Governing Council into a faceless mass, leaving Bremer’s face as the only one most Iraqis saw.

By including fence-sitters and hostile elements as well as American friends in his big, unwieldy IGC and giving them all equal weight, Bremer hoped to display a kind of inclusive, above-it-all neutrality that would win over hostile segments of Iraqi society and convince them that a fully representative Iraqi democracy would emerge. But Iraqis didn’t see it that way. Many saw a foreign occupation of potentially endless length, led by the sort of Americans who can’t be trusted to back up their friends or punish their enemies. Iraqis saw, too, that Syria and Iran had no and were busily entrenching their agents and terrorist recruits into Iraqi society to organize, fund, and equip Sunni bitter-enders like those now terrorizing Fallujah and Shiite thugs like Moqtada al Sadr, the man who is holding hostage the holy city of Najaf.

Slate has a PowerPoint presentation of John Kerry’s military record. I particularly like slides 5 thru 9.

When I was a kid, I read a lot of Communist propaganda. No, not because I loved commies, like liberals do. I read commie propaganda because it’s usually so zealous that it seems like highly entertaining satire.

With the Soviet Union gone, good commie propaganda is much harder to come by. But North Korea’s KCNA news agency has an English-language web site that’s always good for a laugh. Take, for instance, this story:

Korean people’s spirit of guarding the leader with their very lives was fully displayed when there was an unexpected explosion at Ryongchon Railway Station in Ryongchon County, North Phyongan Province, on April 22. Upon hearing the sound of the heavy explosion on their way home for lunch, Choe Yong Il and Jon Tong Sik, workers of the County Procurement Shop, ran back to the shop. They were buried under the collapsing building to die a heroic death when they were trying to come out with portraits of President Kim Il Sung and leader Kim Jong Il.

When the building of Ryongchon Primary School was destroyed by the violent storm and the classroom on the third floor caught fire, teacher Han Un Suk, 32, also died after bringing portraits of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il to a place of safety from the classroom and saving seven pupils.

Teacher Han Jong Suk, 56, also breathed her last with portraits in her bosom.

Principal of the school Choe Pyong Ryop and his son rushed to the accident scene and evacuated materials concerning the revolutionary ideas and immortal exploits of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il from the school, wrapped in fire.

Such noble deed was also done by Head of the County Nursery Pak Sun Mi and seven nurses including Jang Yon Hui, Ri Pong Suk and Principal of Ryongchon Middle School Kang Yong Su.

Many people of the county evacuated portraits before searching after their family members or saving their household goods.

I really wish I had written this. The writer of this editorial gives excellent, detailed examples of just how much opinion is passed off as news today.

The stories we tell define the nation. Stories poorly told can destroy it…

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